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Abstract
This article analyzes the effects of patronage networks on cohesion in the Armed
Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It shows that while patronage
networks provide support to individual military personnel, they undermine both
peer and commander–subordinate bonding. They promote unequal service condi-
tions and statuses and link these to extra-unit and extra-military forms of social
identification, which are further reinforced by soldiers’ living and generating revenue
among civilians. Furthermore, they impair meritocracy and frustrate the extent to
which commanders live up to their subordinates’ expectations. As they fuel internal
conflicts, often around revenue generation, and foster bad service conditions and
distrust toward the political and military leadership, patronage networks also
undermine institutional cohesion. The article concludes that cohesion formation in
the FARDC follows different patterns than in well-institutionalized and well-
resourced militaries. Given that cohesion impacts combat performance and norm
enforcement, these findings are relevant for defense reform efforts and military
cooperation.
Keywords
cohesion/disintegration, sociology, military organization, Africa
1Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Corresponding Author:
Judith Verweijen, Ghent University, Universiteitstraat 8, Ghent, 9000, Belgium.
Email: judith.verweijen@ugent.be
Armed Forces & Society
1-21
ª The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X17740096
journals.sagepub.com/home/afs
The burgeoning military sociological literature on cohesion, or bonding “between
service members and their group, organization, and service institution” (Siebold,
2007, p. 288), has been criticized for being predominantly grounded in research on
western armed forces with high degrees of legal-bureaucratic institutionalization
(Ka¨ihko¨, 2016). Its premises may therefore not be fully applicable to armed forces
in other contexts and with other characteristics. In particular, it may miss out on
specific factors or processes shaping cohesion in these militaries. One such factor is
patronage networks. While patron–client relations can be found in most armed
forces, they are much more salient in certain militaries than in others (Howe,
2001). A good example of a force where patronage networks shape military func-
tioning to a considerable extent is the Forces Arme´es de la Re´publique De´mocra-
tique du Congo (FARDC, Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
In the FARDC, formal command chains intersect and overlap with patronage net-
works that tie military personnel via personal bonds of loyalty to particular patrons-
cum-officers who may or may not be their official superiors (Verweijen, 2013).
While it is likely that such ties affect relationships between military personnel, there
is surprisingly little research on how they impact cohesion.
This article analyzes how patronage networks affect cohesion within the FARDC,
looking at both the microlevel of primary (sections and platoons) and secondary
(battalions and brigades) groups and the mesolevel of the armed forces as a whole. It
also explores macro-level influences on cohesion, analyzing the wider sociopolitical
order of which the armed forces form part. It finds that while patronage networks
provide crucial support to individual military personnel, they tend to undermine
bonding between military personnel of equal rank as well as between subordinates
and their superiors. By fostering differential treatment and service conditions,
patronage ties accentuate differences between same-rank military personnel, in par-
ticular when these ties connect to extra-unit forms of social identification (e.g.,
ethnoregional or ex-rebel backgrounds). Patronage networks also impair merito-
cratic appointments and induce commanders to treat their troops unequally. Further-
more, they promote asymmetries in wealth between commanders and their
subordinates, which the latter experience as disproportionate. At the institutional
level too, patronage networks negatively affect cohesion. They reinforce parallel
command chains, divided loyalties and competition, notably around access to posi-
tions and resources. Additionally, by promoting bad service conditions and antag-
onism toward the top political and military leadership, seen to be implicated in
unscrupulous revenue generation due to patronage-related pressures, they also
undermine soldiers’ bonding with the military organization at large. Identification
with the FARDC is also lessened by patronage networks’ crosscutting character,
implying they encompass both soldiers and civilians, and by the Congolese army’s
limited efforts to socialize its members into professional discourses and identities.
Grasping the effects of patronage on military cohesion is important for both
theoretical and policy reasons. First, studying patronage networks deepens an under-
standing of the processes and factors commonly identified to impact cohesion in
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military settings, including their relative causal weight. It may also provide new
insights into how other conditions that often combine with low levels of legal-
bureaucratic institutionalization affect military cohesion, such as armed forces’
involvement in economic activities, their not approximating a “total institution”
(Goffman, 1961), and processes of rebel–military integration. Second, understand-
ing how patronage affects cohesion is crucial for guiding and assessing processes of
defense reform and military collaboration more widely. Cohesion shapes both mil-
itary performance and, by impacting norm enforcement, soldiers’ behavior toward
civilians, including their propensity to engage in abuses (Siebold, 2007). A better
insight into these dimensions of military functioning may render reform efforts more
effective and may facilitate military-to-military cooperation, for instance, within the
framework of peacekeeping missions.
The article is structured as follows. The next section discusses the concept of
military cohesion, which is followed by a brief explanation of the employed meth-
ods. Subsequently, a snapshot is provided of the history of the FARDC. The next
parts explore the effects of patronage networks on institutional cohesion, bonding
between same-rank military, and commander–subordinate bonding, respectively.
The concluding section offers reflections on the theoretical and policy relevance
of the findings.
Cohesion in Military Settings
Within military sociology, views differ on how cohesion should be defined, oper-
ationalized, and measured (Bartone, Johnsen, Eid, Brun, & Laberg, 2002; King,
2013; Siebold, 1999, 2011). Attempting to synthesize decades of research into a
broad general framework, Siebold (2007) proposes a “standard model of military
group cohesion.”1 For Siebold, cohesion relates to a relationship structure with
both affective and instrumental dimensions that establishes mutual trust and loy-
alty. This relationship structure impacts military conduct and motivation by facil-
itating collective action and promoting adhesion to group norms. It is (re)produced
by both formal and informal social interaction, which may be either interpersonal
or collective. Furthermore, it encompasses both task and social cohesion, seen to
partly overlap (Siebold, 2011). Social cohesion relates to whether group members
like each other, hence refers to the nature and quality of emotional bonds of
friendship, as based on personal characteristics. Task cohesion, in turn, refers to
commitment to a common mission that requires collective action to accomplish
(MacCoun, 1993).
In Siebold’s model, cohesion in military organizations consists of four interre-
lated components. The first two constitute primary group cohesion and consist of
horizontal cohesion (ties between soldiers at approximately the same level of the
hierarchy) and vertical cohesion (relations between subordinates and their immedi-
ate commanders). The second two constitute secondary group cohesion and relate to
organizational cohesion (the relations between military personnel and their
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overarching unit of organization, like a battalion or brigade) and institutional cohe-
sion (the relations between soldiers and their overall organizational branch or the
armed forces in general).
Military sociologists and other scholars have identified a wide array of factors
that shape cohesion, although views on the most relevant dimensions and causal
mechanisms diverge (Bartone et al., 2002; Siebold, 1999). To facilitate the analysis
of how these factors shape cohesion in the FARDC, and are influenced by patronage
networks, they were regrouped into four clusters (for a further elaboration, see
Verweijen, 2015).
The first cluster of factors, which shapes both peer and commander-subordinate
bonding, is named after Shils and Janowitz’s (1948) notion of “community of
experience.” It relates to the length and characteristics of troops’ living, training,
and operating together, hence predominantly to social interaction. Contrary to Shils
and Janowitz’s (1948) interpretation, it excludes “homogeneity of origins”, based on
the consideration that while social identification is shaped by social interaction, it
cannot be equated by it. “Community of experience” encompasses the following
factors: (1) exposure to common threats and shared hardships, including in the
context of combat operations (Henderson, 1985; Wesbrook, 1980); (2) (the success
of) carrying out common tasks, including during training (Cockerham, 1978; Mac-
Coun, Kier, & Belkin, 2006); (3) extensive training in the same unit composition as
during combat, which allows for developing shared systems of communication and
routines (King, 2006); and (4) the extent to which troops need each other for survival
and the provision of basic needs, such as health care, food, and clothing. As argued
by Shils and Janowitz (1948), where soldiers depend on civilians for satisfying such
needs, they are less oriented toward the primary combat unit.
The second cluster of factors, equally shaping both peer and commander-sub-
ordinate bonding, was labeled “commonality of identification and beliefs”. It draws
inspiration from Henderson’s (1985: 26) notion of “commonality of values”, which
refers to commonalities in ethnic background, nationality, gender, and socio-eco-
nomic standing (hence overlaps with Shils and Janowitz’ “homogeneity of origins”).
The terms “identification” and “beliefs” were found to be more analytically accurate
than “values,” in part as “beliefs” is seen herein as a wider category that encom-
passes worldviews and ideologies, which also shape cohesion (Moskos, 1970). In
recent years, scholars have pointed to the diminishing relevance of preexisting
identities (such as masculinity, ethnicity, and nationality) in the context of the
increasing professionalization of the armed forces and a shift in emphasis toward
task cohesion (King, 2013). These findings indicate that the relative importance of
common forms of identification in shaping cohesion is contextual. For that reason,
“commonality of identification and beliefs” is considered herein to relate to the
“(perceived) salience” of homogeneity in terms of (ethnoregional) origins, language,
worldviews, and political–ideological and other beliefs. “(Perceived) salience” indi-
cates the extent to which similarities and differences are seen to “make a difference”
within formal and informal social interaction. It is partly shaped by the relative
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strength and significations of preexisting (i.e., before entering the current military
group) civilian and military forms of identification. Certainly, the (perceived) sal-
ience of identities is also an outcome and not only a driver of cohesion formation.
Yet, it is plausible to assume that where soldiers experience certain shared traits to
either bind or divide them, these traits have also contributed to that outcome.
In addition to “community of experience” and “commonality of identification
and beliefs,” bonding between troops and their superiors in both primary and sec-
ondary groups is shaped by additional elements, here regrouped in the third cluster of
factors. Since in secondary groups in the FARDC, this cluster has preponderant
influence on setting “the unit culture and climate under which service members live
and operate” (Siebold, 2007, p. 290), it is considered to importantly shape organiza-
tional cohesion herein. Its first component is the extent to which commanders’
appointment is seen as legitimate, which is in part shaped by respect for meritocratic
criteria (Wesbrook, 1980). The second component takes inspiration from Shils and
Janowitz’s (1948) approach to identify the characteristics of commanders that sub-
ordinates find desirable. They observe that in the Wehrmacht, subordinates bonded
sooner with commanders when the latter were trusted, competent, and cared for the
well-being of their troops but also disciplined them when needed, thus displaying a
combination of fatherly benevolence and sternness (Shils & Janowitz, 1948). Taking
into account that soldiers of armed forces situated in different sociocultural and
military settings might value different command characteristics, it was decided not
to depart from a preset range but to first identify what FARDC soldiers perceive as
desirable traits among commanders. Subsequently, it was explored to what extent
commanders were experienced to live up to these expectations.
The fourth cluster of factors relates to institutional cohesion. As described earlier,
Siebold (2007) interprets institutional cohesion as relating to soldiers’ bonding with
the military at large. Yet the term has also been used to refer to the coherence of the
military organization as a whole (e.g., Mora, 2002). This second component is also
taken into consideration herein and is seen to be shaped by (1) the extent to which the
military’s subdivisions and units collaborate rather than compete and (2) the extent
to which lower levels of the organization are directed by the official hierarchy. The
first component, relating to soldiers’ bonding, in turn, is influenced by five different
factors. These include (1) service conditions, such as training opportunities and
arrangements for career progression, and (2) perceptions of the legitimacy of the
top political and military leadership (Siebold, 2007; Wesbrook, 1980). Both these
factors help give a sense of purpose and meaningfulness to soldiers, thus enhancing
their commitment to the military organization, its mission, and its norms (Siebold,
2007). Such commitment may also be reinforced by (3) worldviews and ideologies,
provided that those of soldiers and the military organization align (Moskos, 1970;
Wesbrook, 1980), and (4) active investment by the military organization in socializ-
ing their members into professional discourses and norms, and in promoting iden-
tification with and allegiance to the organization (Arkin & Dobrofsky, 1978). In
order for soldiers to remain committed to the military organization, a final factor of
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importance is (5) that society demonstrates recognition of their service, for instance,
in the form of symbolic rewards (Henderson, 1985; Wesbrook, 1980).
In the following, it is explored how the cohesion-fostering factors regrouped in
these four different clusters are impacted by patronage networks. Hence, the latter is
not considered an additional factor herein, but a phenomenon that influences the
different factors shaping cohesion. But before turning to this analysis, it is important
to clarify what is meant by patronage networks. The latter is understood as social
networks cemented by patron–client ties, which are asymmetric but reciprocal rela-
tions that have two overlapping dimensions: The first is a dyadic, personal relation-
ship that involves the granting of favors and assistance by a patron to an individual
client in exchange for support and loyalty. The second dimension is a hierarchical
relationship between a patron and a network of clients and involves the exchange of
collective goods, including symbolic ones such as “representation”, for (political)
support and loyalty (Erdmann & Engel, 2006). However, as pointed out by Utas
(2012), patronage networks also contain more horizontal relations and social ties
formed on other grounds, such as ethnic, professional, religious, or geographical
background. We should therefore conceptualize such networks as complex, multi-
dimensional webs of social relations. Moreover, within political orders qualified as
“neopatrimonial,” patronage networks infuse and intersect and overlap with formal
bureaucratic hierarchies (Bayart, 1989/2006; Erdmann & Engel, 2006). In many
cases, this applies to hierarchies in both political and military institutions, in part
as there is a mutual influence between the two (Ikpe, 2000). For instance, rulers’
efforts to maintain control over the armed forces often follow patterns of co-optation
and coercion that are heavily shaped by patronage logics, which in turn reinforces
the salience of patronage within the military institution (Howe, 2001). This illus-
trates how military cohesion is shaped not only by factors internal to the armed
forces but also by the features of the macro-political order of which they are part.
Note on Methods
The data presented in this article were gathered during 14 months of ethnographic
field research conducted between 2010 and 2012 in the eastern Congo’s Kivu prov-
inces for a doctoral thesis on civilian–military interaction. Semistructured interviews
were held with at least 400 civilians and over 150 military personnel, 35 of who were
key informants who were also contacted via informal conversations. A part of this
research focused on military cohesion, considered important for understanding the
FARDC’s behavior toward civilians. The choice to study the FARDC was informed
by its bad human rights record and reports that its behavior toward civilians differed
considerably per brigade/regiment and per deployment context, allowing for explor-
ing the factors shaping military behavior through a comparative case study design.
Furthermore, the author had lived and worked in the Congo prior to starting doctoral
research, which was deemed to facilitate data collection and interpretation. The
majority of the contacted military personnel belonged to the 14 different brigades
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or regiments that were selected as cases. In relation to each unit, a range of condi-
tions shaping cohesion was studied, such as its trajectory in terms of genesis, train-
ing, and combat deployment; its overall composition (military and ethnoregional
background of personnel); and personnel’s living patterns and revenue-generation
practices. The selection of interviewees from the FARDC occurred partly via snow-
ball sampling, as a degree of trust was required to discuss sensitive questions. Yet
continuing efforts were made to balance military from different ranks and from
various military, ethnoregional, and linguistic backgrounds. A more detailed
description of the used methods and data collection process can be found in Ver-
weijen (2015).
A Brief History of a Merged Military
In 2003, the belligerents of the Second Congo War (1998–2003) adopted a peace
accord based on political and military power sharing. The main warring factions
agreed to dismantle their military structures and send their troops and officers into
the newly formed Integrated Brigades and integrated command chain. The military
merging process was however marred by irregularities, as the different factions tried to
retain a maximum of influence. They often came to constitute patronage networks
within the FARDC, although some gradually dissolved or transformed (Verweijen,
2014). Another complicating factor was the ex-belligerents’ widely diverging military
backgrounds, encompassing, inter alia: government troops with decades of military
education and training, including former members of the Forces Arme´es Zaı¨roises
(FAZ), the army under President Mobutu Sese Seko (1965–1996); military from rebel
armies with thousands of troops whose organization resembled that of government
forces and who had received considerable training from instructors of foreign or
former militaries; and troops from small-scale militias known as “Mai-Mai” with very
local spheres of influence, who had mostly learned by doing (Verweijen, 2014, 2015).
The military integration process unleashed a scramble for ranks and positions.
Within this competition, the bigger and more powerful rebel forces, notably the
Rassemblement Congolais pour la De´mocratie (RCD), as well as government net-
works close to President Kabila, generally prevailed. Both appointments and the
distribution of ranks followed political considerations rather than criteria of military
experience and competence (Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2010; Verweijen, 2014).
Consequently, ex-rebel officers with limited experience and low levels of military
and sometimes general education were awarded high ranks and command positions.
The same applied to rebels who integrated after the initial merger that created the
FARDC, which was a regular occurrence up to 2013. These periodic influxes of
rebels further reinforced nonmeritocratic appointments, and the salience of patron-
age networks formed along ex-rebel lines (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen, 2013a).
Deficient meritocracy generates important frictions in the FARDC’s day-to-day
functioning, as experienced and well-educated military personnel are often placed
under the command of younger officers with limited knowledge of military matters,
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some of who are even illiterate (Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2010). A Noncommissioned
Officer (NCO) explained:
I am very dissatisfied. I have had a good education, because I went to the EFO [basic
officer education school during the Mobutu era], I know the Re`glement militaire
(military code of conduct) but my superiors have not had any education. They don’t
know anything, absolutely nothing. Even if I greet them, I feel a pain somewhere in my
heart.
Another officer, similarly complaining about his superiors, said: “We call them les
profanes (the uninitiated), since they haven’t had military education. They are
simply civilians.” He and his colleagues also used the expression grades brusques,
commandement brutal (abrupt ranks, brutal command) to describe ex-rebel com-
manders’ alleged coarseness.
Aside from military background, the factions that integrated into the FARDC
differed in terms of ethnoregional, linguistic, and generational belonging. Many ex-
government forces are well-educated ex-FAZ officers who speak Lingala and ori-
ginate from the western part of the Congo. They distinguish themselves from a
younger generation of ex-government soldiers consisting of Swahiliphones from the
east who were first recruited into the insurgency that overthrew Mobutu in 1997 or
entered the military in its wake (Verweijen, 2015). In relation to the ex-rebel forces,
the main differences are ethnoregional and linguistic. Most ex-Mai-Mai troops are
Swahiliphones from the east who belong to ethnic groups that define themselves as
“autochthones” (the first/native inhabitants of the area). “Autochthones” have tense
relations with “Rwandophones”, who are speakers of Kinyarwanda language
(encompassing both Tutsi and Hutu) and equally originate from the east (Eriksson
Baaz & Verweijen, 2013a).
Rwandophones dominated both the RCD and the Congre`s National pour la
De´fense du Peuple (CNDP), a rebel group that integrated into the FARDC in
2009. Due to their political and military weight, both these groups, which remained
intact as patronage networks in the FARDC, were privileged in the distribution of
ranks and positions. When the CNDP joined the FARDC, the Integrated Brigades
were broken up and replaced by brigades deployed under a new operational com-
mand created for the Kivu provinces, from 2010 onward called “Amani Leo.” The
ex-CNDP had preponderant influence over the Amani Leo command, maintaining
parallel systems of command, intelligence, logistics, and armament (United Nations
Security Council [UNSC], 2010). An effort to reduce their influence in 2011 by
breaking up the operational brigades and creating regiments largely failed. It was
only in 2012, when a part of the ex-CNDP deserted and launched a new rebellion,
that this network’s influence in the FARDC waned (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen,
2013a).
While differences in treatment often result predominantly from asymmetries in
political weight, FARDC personnel tend to ascribe them primarily to identity,
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understood in an essentialized manner. For instance, many former Mai-Mai and ex-
government troops attribute their alleged marginalization in the FARDC to the
command chain being “dominated” by Rwandophones (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen,
2013a). In the words of an NCO: “The Banyamulenge [a Rwandophone Tutsi group]
officers always want to dominate the Bantu [considered autochthones]. They impose
themselves, they always want to be the chief. This is why there are conflicts here in
the east.” Rwandophones, in turn, in particular Tutsi military personnel, also feel
discriminated against in the military. A former FARDC company commander
testified:
When you get into trouble with your subordinates, it suddenly matters that you are a
Tutsi. I was closely monitoring my soldiers. They were engaging in all sorts of illicit
business like extortion and cheating, putting up barriers and producing alcohol ( . . . )
One evening I called them to explain they should change their behavior but they got
angry. The next days they were whispering behind my back. Then one evening three of
them came up to me saying: ‘if you do not tone down, you Tutsi, we will shoot you’.
How can I serve in such a military?
In sum, rebel–military integration reinforced the importance of patronage networks
within the FARDC. The effects on cohesion were fourfold: first, being linked to
power asymmetries, ex-rebel patronage networks created differences in treatment
and service conditions, therefore affecting “community of experience”; second, the
overlap with power asymmetries rendered the differences in identification that
marked ex-rebel networks more salient, thus impacting “commonality of identifica-
tion and beliefs”; third, rebel–military integration undermined the perceived legiti-
macy of the appointment of commanders of both primary and secondary groups; and
fourth, by fostering power competition and parallel command chains, as well as
undermining trust in the military top leadership, it weakened institutional cohesion
(Verweijen, 2015).
Effects on Institutional Cohesion: Conflicts, Parallelisms, and Bad Soldiering
Rebel–military integration is not the only factor contributing to limited institutional
cohesion in the FARDC. In fact, the most important patronage network in the FARDC is
not an ex-rebel force but emanates from the presidential military office, the maison
militaire. This office controls much of the core general staff and ministry of defense
functions, including procurement, logistics, military intelligence, the presidential
guard, and appointments to key positions. It also has “clients” among commanders of
the most important brigades or regiments, occasionally giving them orders while
bypassing the regular command chain (the general staff in Kinshasa and the commands
of the defense zones and military regions; International Crisis Group [ICG], 2006).
The maison militaire promotes measures that lead to constant reappointments of
command and staff functions, including frequent reorganizations (e.g., the creation
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of the Amani Leo structures and the regiments). The reasons for this are twofold.
First, frequent rotations of office prevent officers from building up an autonomous
power position, thus keeping them dependent on, and hence loyal to, the presidential
circle. Second, the flux resulting from constant changes in positions fosters ongoing
competition between different patronage networks. This competition keeps the mil-
itary divided and therefore prevents it from becoming a threat to the president’s
power (Verweijen, 2015; cf. Bayart, 1989/2006).
A key stake in this ongoing competition is access to income-generation oppor-
tunities. Many top officers in the FARDC are involved in a wide range of economic
activities, such as import/export trade, natural resources exploitation, or real estate
(UNSC, 2010; Verweijen, 2013). Enrichment in the higher echelons encourages
revenue generation lower down the command chain, in part as it leads to the
embezzlement of funds destined for the rank and file, such as money for health care
and rations. At the same time, soldiers’ wages are very low (around US$100 a
month, which does not allow for maintaining even a small family), and there are
no social services or benefits, such as family assistance. Soldiers even have to partly
pay for basic items and services themselves, such as transport for rotations and
health care. Consequently, they solicit such services from civilians but at much
lower tariffs and sometimes without paying. Due to the scarcity of barracks and
tents, FARDC troops also have to arrange their own accommodation, generally
staying in rooms and houses rented from civilians. To finance these expenses and
maintain a basic standard of living, soldiers engage in revenue generation, both
individually (e.g., petty trade) and with their units (e.g., illegal taxation at roadblocks
and mining sites). Superiors commonly oblige their subordinates to cede a part of the
collectively generated revenues. Each commander, in turn, has to transmit a share of
that money to their own patrons higher up in the hierarchy. Not obeying this impera-
tive is potentially costly, as it can lead to being dismissed or transferred to other, less
lucrative jobs or areas (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen, 2013b; Verweijen, 2013, 2015).
The drive for revenue generation sparks conflicts between patronage networks.
Patrons try to influence appointments of both themselves and their clients, striving
for command positions and deployment to lucrative areas, such as mining sites or
border posts. However, they can withdraw their support for such deployment any
moment or be overruled by rivals, causing their clients to lose their position and
income. The ever-present possibility of a sudden loss of position prompts military
personnel to accumulate the maximum of resources while they can (Verweijen,
2013). Additionally, ongoing power struggles may drive officers to exploit their
official position to block opponents, for instance, by manipulating the military
justice system.2 To be shielded against the resulting political and economic insecur-
ity, military personnel are prompted to solicit protection from powerful patrons who
can influence the military leadership and military justice system (Eriksson Baaz &
Verweijen, 2013b; cf. Chabal & Daloz, 1999).
Conflicts and competition between patronage networks do not only undermine
institutional cohesion but also have detrimental effects on operational effectiveness,
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as they hamper collaboration and information sharing. Moreover, the preoccupation
with revenue generation diverts both attention and resources from military duties
(UNSC, 2010). Additionally, the urge to promote factional influence and business
interests often induces collusion with armed groups, leading for instance to infor-
mation leaks and the conclusion of informal “nonaggression pacts” (Eriksson Baaz
& Verweijen, 2013a; UNSC, 2010). Enrichment by the higher echelons and super-
iors’ collusion with enemy forces, in combination with poor service conditions, also
undermine soldiers’ combat motivation. Many soldiers hesitate risking their lives for
an institution that neglects them or for superiors believed to be in cahoots with the
enemy (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen, 2013a).
These sentiments point to military personnel’s weak bonding with the military
institution, the second form of institutional cohesion described earlier. An important
cause of this weakness is discrepancies between idealized notions of soldiering and
the lived experiences of serving in the FARDC. Congolese soldiers’ conceptualiza-
tions of “good soldiering” revolve around dignity, morality, order, and discipline,
including respect for the hierarchy. Another central notion is patriotism, reflected in
soldiers’ understanding of their mandate as “defending the country’s territorial
integrity and protecting the population and their goods” (Eriksson Baaz & Stern,
2008; Verweijen, 2015). These various ideals are to be realized through education,
training, and good living and service conditions. This idealized image of soldiering,
however, is almost diametrically opposed to soldiers’ lived realities (Eriksson Baaz
& Stern, 2008). In everyday life, FARDC personnel experience to belong to the
poorest segments of society, to operate in disorganization and with variable disci-
pline, to have limited access to training and education and few prospects of social
mobility, and to serve in an organization where parochial interests rather than self-
sacrifice for the fatherland dominate (Verweijen, 2015).
The discrepancies between soldiering as it is and soldiering as it should be cause
FARDC personnel from all backgrounds to feel disappointed, disillusioned,
neglected, and disrespected by the military organization (see also Eriksson Baaz
& Stern, 2008). As a popular expression in the FARDC goes: Nous avons des
militaires, mais pas d’arme´e (we have soldiers but no military). A substantial part
of the FARDC personnel interviewed indicated they would rather leave military
service, provided they had the means and possibility to find alternative sources of
income—which most said they had not. In the absence of pensions (rules for which
exist on paper but are not implemented), the difficulty to find alternative income also
keeps those ripe for retirement in active service. A 60-year-old ex-FAZ soldier
explained: “The Congolese military is like corve´e (forced labor) and one is forced
to stay there until death.” In spite of the alleged difficulties to leave the military,
desertion rates appear to be high (Verweijen, 2015). This points not only to low
institutional cohesion but also to low levels of bonding with the primary and sec-
ondary group (Griffith, 2002; Henderson, 1985).
Another factor that undermines institutional cohesion in the FARDC is the expe-
rienced limited societal appreciation for the FARDC. As a corporal explained:
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Being a soldier is to sacrifice oneself. It is a work of sacrifice. You die because of
people that you do not know. But civilians have an easy life. Despite the deaths, the
population doesn’t accept you, doesn’t appreciate you. And if you quit, the population
doesn’t accept you either. We will always be seen like malfaiteurs (wrongdoers).
An important reason for civilians’ disrespect for the FARDC is soldiers’ penchant to
extract money, goods, and services from them (Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2008), which
is an indirect consequence of patronage-induced duties to generate resources at
different levels of the hierarchy. Engagement in frantic resources generation is also
at the root of soldiers’ dislike of the political leadership in Kinshasa, held respon-
sible for soldiers’ miserable living conditions by embezzling funds, in collaboration
with the highest echelons of the military. Additionally, both political and military
elites, part of the same patronage networks, are believed to manipulate war for the
purposes of self-enrichment. These beliefs, which are captured in the widely circu-
lating expression bakonzi basi bateki mboka na bango, bolingi biso tosala nini (the
leadership has sold out the country, what can we subordinates do?), indicate that
political and military elites’ objectives are perceived to be at cross-purposes with
soldiers’ professed ideology of patriotism (Verweijen, 2015). The result is feelings
of purposelessness and alienation, which nourish hostility toward the political and
military leadership. One way in which this hostility is expressed among officers is
fantasizing about overthrowing the government. An intelligence officer stated:
The current government is a disaster. We have to replace the current president. That
cannot be too difficult. Me, I am ready. It takes nothing to take Bukavu [capital of
South Kivu province]. Some rocket launchers, a bit of light artillery, and some dis-
ciplined troops. That’s all.
Limited bonding with the military organization is aggravated by the FARDC’s lack
of efforts to socialize its troops into formal professional discourses and identities.
Since the FARDC was formed, most soldiers have received little training and edu-
cation, which is only for new recruits. Furthermore, soldiers rarely get into contact
with FARDC personnel outside their secondary group, as most brigades or regiments
are permanently deployed on the frontlines. Additionally, medals or honors are rare,
and there are no mottos or songs specific to the FARDC (Verweijen, 2015). At the
same time, due to their embedding into patronage networks that encompass civilians,
but also the dependency on and intermingling with civilians to fulfill needs like
accommodation and revenue generation, military personnel are strongly exposed to
extra-military forms of identification (Verweijen, 2015). Thus, they have spheres of
living and working that are partially separate from the military unit and hence do not
entail the copresence of colleagues. This gives the FARDC a less “total” character as
an institution (cf. Goffman, 1961). Patronage networks also contribute to this out-
come in a more direct way, as they lower the influence of the formal administration
12 Armed Forces & Society XX(X)
on regulating military personnel’s lives, seen as a crucial feature of total institutions
(Davies, 1989).
Effects on Horizontal Cohesion: Survival Solidarity and Survival Patronage
The patronage networks that FARDC soldiers are embedded in diverge in strength,
scope, cohesiveness, and the nature of the social interaction that they regulate.
Where military patrons are powerful, they are able to provide significant services
to their clients, such as influencing their appointments and deployments. Where they
are weaker, they may not be able to influence the military hierarchy on important
decisions but still help their clients, for instance, by granting them access to revenue-
generating opportunities in their personal businesses (Verweijen, 2015). Hence,
patronage networks shape soldiers’ living and service conditions but not in equal
degree. The result is inequalities between personnel serving in the same unit, pro-
vided they are part of different patronage networks, which is most often (but not
always) the case.
These inequalities, which are generally less pronounced among the lowest ranks,
have an important impact on “community of experience,” which in the FARDC
largely centers on basic needs provision and sharing the hardships of daily life.
FARDC soldiers in the same primary unit help each other with basic tasks such as
constructing shelter, searching for firewood and water, and small-scale revenue
generation (e.g., charcoal production). Such social interaction generates forms of
“despair solidarity” (Bilakila, 2004, p. 23) or pragmatic and practically oriented
solidarity that revolves around mutual assistance in the struggle for survival.
Although its effects are undermined by the frequent break up of brigades due to
reorganizations, such solidarity fosters horizontal cohesion. Commenting on the
hardships they experienced in the camp where they were mixed with rebel forces,
one NCO said: “Despite some difficulties, people always manage ( . . . ) People
suffered, but that did not disturb the education. This is military endurance ( . . . ) It
has contributed to developing esprit d’e´quipe (team spirit).” Hence, similar to what
Moskos (1970) observed, cohesion in the FARDC has an instrumental dimension,
being in part an outcome of self-interest in the struggle for survival. However, where
self-interest requires loyalty to networks outside one’s unit, attention from and
commitment toward one’s peers is deflected. Given the harsh conditions in the
FARDC, support from such patronage networks, however limited, is often crucial
to ensuring that soldiers remain committed to their job. Hence paradoxically, while
patronage networks weaken institutional cohesion, they ultimately also help prevent
the military from falling apart (Verweijen, 2015).
One reason why basic needs provision plays a central role in fostering cohesion
among lower ranks in the FARDC is that the other two dimensions of “community of
experience”(training and common tasks) have limited or ambivalent effects. As
mentioned, training in the FARDC is rare. Furthermore, while troops regularly
conduct military tasks together, including military operations, the impact on peer
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bonding is mixed (Verweijen, 2015). In some cases, frontline experiences reinforce
comradeship. For instance, soldiers of a platoon who displayed a considerable level
of mutual bonding highlighted their pride in having carried out operations against
the rebel group Forces Re´publicaines Fe´de´ralistes in the cold and impenetrable
Bijabo forest in South Kivu. Aside from shared hardships, these operations promoted
comradeship through common dislike of “the enemy” who was in this case of Tutsi
origins, while the unit members identified themselves as “Bantu” (non-Tutsi). Yet in
other cases, joint military operations were observed to sow discord and division,
especially when ending in failure and when soldiers already distrusted one another.
In such situations, mistakes and a (perceived) lack of efforts evoked the suspicion of
backstabbing and betrayal. One soldier related for instance how his unit had lost the
way during an offensive against a Mai-Mai group due to wrong directions given by
an ex-Mai Mai unit member, which elicited suspicion he was in connivance with the
enemy, although he had belonged to a different Mai-Mai group.
Distrust among soldiers is particularly high where soldiers in the same primary unit
are tied into competing patronage networks that are linked to antagonistically defined
identity categories, a situation that impacts “commonality of identification and beliefs.”
Differences in identification also become more salient where the associated patronage
networks offer high levels of protection, causing pronounced inequality in service
conditions and statuses among group members. In such cases, identities become
markers of perceived favoritism and power inequalities and start working as a divi-
sionary mechanism (Verweijen, 2015). For instance, one NCO from the western Congo
commented on his colleagues: “The soldiers [from the west] have now such a bad
reputation that they [soldiers from the east] say ‘Lingala is the language of thieves
(ya bavoyoux)’. They have turned against the basemalingala (those who speak
Lingala).” At the moment he pronounced these words, the regiment of which he was
part was subject to important conflicts, as the members from one specific ex-rebel
network used their dominance in the command to favor their own group.
Effects on Vertical and Organizational Cohesion: mauvais pe`re de famille
The factors constituting “community of experience” and “commonality of identifi-
cation and beliefs” do not only undermine horizontal cohesion but also affect bond-
ing between subordinates and commanders both in primary and in secondary units,
albeit sometimes in slightly different ways or degrees. For instance, the frequent
break up of units harms “community of experience” even stronger in the case of
commander–subordinate relations, as it forces troops to adjust each time to new
command styles. In the words of a sergeant:
All the time changes is not good, because we are not stable. A chef knows the behavior
of his soldiers and the soldiers know their chef and that eases the work ( . . . ). There are
many changes but one commander is soft, the other one is strict, so we do not know
how to adapt ourselves.
14 Armed Forces & Society XX(X)
Both “community of experience” and “commonality of identification and beliefs”
interact in complex manners with the two other elements that shape superior–sub-
ordinate bonding. These are first, the perceived legitimacy of commanders’ appoint-
ment and second, the extent to which commanders live up to their subordinates’
expectations. Both of these are negatively affected by patronage. As described
earlier, when commanders are appointed or promoted due to their patronage con-
nections rather than due to merit, the perceived legitimacy of their appointment is
undermined. One officer described it as follows: “The FARDC is still very hier-
archical, ranks continue to be of influence, but they do no longer automatically give
a certain respect.”
The effects of nonmeritocratic appointments on cohesion are aggravated by their
impact on “community of experience”. When commanders are perceived to be incom-
petent and inexperienced, joint tasks and activities might foster conflicts, distrust, and
irritations, rather than cohesion (Verweijen, 2015). This applies particularly to combat
operations leading to defeat, failure, or casualties—negative experiences that are often
blamed on commanders’ lack of competence or their doubtful loyalty and motivations.
Suspect loyalty is most often invoked when commanders belong to certain identity
groups that are distrusted, pointing to interaction effects with “commonality of iden-
tification and beliefs.” Ultimately, such aggravated distrust may lead to insubordina-
tion (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen, 2013a). A former NCO explained:
It is extremely difficult to carry out badly given orders for professional military. We
say: ‘a badly given order might not be executed’, especially when it causes many
deaths. For example, if you fight against Rwandans [i.e. a certain Rwandan rebel
group], you will know that at some point they will outflank: therefore you need to
send two sections to the sides. However, if the commanding officer does not know, he
will send all troops straight ahead but they will be encircled by the enemy. We know
this from experience, but our commander went ahead and then many troops died. When
this happened we rebelled against him and withdrew.
Causing unnecessary casualties frustrates the expectations that FARDC soldiers
have vis-a`-vis those enacting the role of “commander,” which are largely the same
for commanders of primary and secondary groups. For FARDC soldiers, comman-
ders should uphold high moral standards, constitute role models, which also implies
giving troops fair and equal treatment, and demonstrate commitment to the unit’s
common goals (Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2008; Verweijen, 2015). As a corporal
stated: “Being a good commander is like being a pastor, he is first a model for his
troops.” Furthermore, soldiers expect commanders to be educated and competent,
not least to reduce risks on the battlefield. As a lieutenant said: “A commander must
be educated. It is like in medicine, you first have to master the theory before you can
do the practice. On the basis of practice alone you cannot make a diagnosis.”
Additionally, soldiers want commanders to have father-like and protective
qualities, including by assuring subordinates’ primary needs but also by
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demonstrating sternness and disciplining troops firmly but fairly when needed.
These expectations are often expressed in paternal metaphors, like that a
commander should be a bon pe`re de famille (good head of the household).
As has already become clear, FARDC officers rarely live up to these idealized
expectations of commanding. In the words of one soldier, an FARDC commander is
often a “mauvais pe`re de famille” (bad head of the household). Patronage-related
pressures are an important cause of such deficient performance. Commanders simul-
taneously have obligations toward their hierarchy, their troops, their clients, and
their patrons, having to provide the latter with regular financial contributions to
maintain their position. Yet they also use the resources appropriated from their
subordinates for purposes of self-enrichment, causing immense asymmetries in
wealth, and signifying limited commitment to soldiers’ well-being and to the unit
and its goals. As a lieutenant stated:
The wife of the deputy commander lives next to the wife of the colonel, because she has
nothing to eat. And when he, who has a big house, gives orders, do you think that he
who has nothing is going to obey? ( . . . ) The distances between the high-ranking and
the low-ranking are simply too big ( . . . ) They cheat us. We have nothing, absolutely
nothing ( . . . ) I have a bad cough but not even enough money to get medicine. They
will not even give you a paracetamol [pain killer] when you are sick. No nothing, not
even a single Franc congolais [Congolese currency]! They do not care if we die.
Another way in which commanders are seen to frustrate the expectations surround-
ing their role is unequal treatment of subordinates. Due to the high level of de facto
decentralization in the force, FARDC commanders, in particular at brigade, regi-
ment, and battalion level, have significant leeway to shape their subordinates’ living
and working conditions. They make, for instance, decisions on leave, assigned tasks
(which determine levels of income), and transport possibilities. While there are
formal rules and regulations to manage these dimensions of service, these are rarely
enforced (Verweijen, 2015). Consequently, commanders can deploy the granting
and withholding of what they consider “favors” (which in some other militaries
would be defined as “rights”) as bargaining chips in their relations with subordi-
nates. Such a high level of discretion allows commanders to favor those in their
personal patronage networks, instead of following predictable criteria of perfor-
mance and compliance. The result is that the other subordinates feel disadvantaged.
They often frame such perceived marginalization in identity-related terms, indicat-
ing that “commonality of identification and beliefs” is at play. For instance, after
stating he was marginalized by his Rwandophone commander, an ex-FAZ officer
declared: “I would no longer call this an army. Everything is negotiable. Openly,
there is no tribalism, but behind the scenes, it is very strong.”
The problem of preferential treatment can also be found in relation to practices of
disciplining and punishment. Commanders may be more lenient toward their own
favorites in the unit as well as toward subordinates that are embedded in other, more
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powerful patronage networks. The latter may interfere in commanders’ disciplining
practices to protect their clients, for instance, by asking them not to refer a case to the
military prosecutor’s office (Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen, 2013b). Such practices
promote discontent not only toward commanders but also toward colleagues, as
those who have transgressed are not punished according to the rules. In this manner,
patronage interference in disciplining also undermines horizontal cohesion.
Concluding Remarks: Theoretical and Policy Implications
This article has analyzed how patronage networks that overlap and intersect with
formal command chains undermine cohesion in the Congolese armed forces, both in
primary and in secondary groups and at the level of the military as a whole. The
findings demonstrate that cohesion formation in the FARDC follows different pat-
terns than in other militaries, both due to the relevance of patronage networks and a
number of other conditions that enhance these networks’ salience. For instance, due
to poor and irregular work and living conditions, assistance with basic needs pro-
vision and regulating elementary dimensions of service has a pronounced impact on
cohesion. The same applies to extensive engagement in revenue generation, which
fosters internal conflicts and promotes collaboration with enemy forces and civi-
lians. Obviously, in well-resourced and well-institutionalized armies, and those that
do not engage in economic activities, cohesion is not or less influenced by these
factors. Another particularity of the FARDC is that it less approximates a “total
institution” than some other militaries. It possesses limited infrastructure and facil-
ities of its own, causing soldiers to live among civilians, and undertakes minimal
efforts to socialize its members into common discourses and identities. A final
cohesion-impacting condition not always found in other militaries is rebel–military
integration, which may reinforce parallel power structures and undermine meritoc-
racy. While this combination of elements may be specific to the FARDC, armed
forces in many other contexts share at least some of these features. For instance, both
rebel–military integration and military–economic involvement occur in militaries
across the world and have in many cases demonstrated to have detrimental effects on
military cohesion (Bro¨mmelhorster & Paes, 2003; Licklider, 2014). Comparative
research on the processes and conditions shaping military cohesion is therefore
warranted.
Grasping these processes and conditions is not merely of theoretical importance
but is also relevant for defense reform efforts and military collaboration. Studying
the effects of patronage on cohesion provides insights into wider power dynamics in
armed forces and sheds light on soldiers’ combat performance and behavior toward
civilians. Understanding these dimensions facilitates military-to-military collabora-
tion, like in the context of peacekeeping operations or joint security activities
between peacekeeping forces and host-country military. For instance, the United
Nations peacekeeping mission in the Congo conducts joint military operations and
patrols with the FARDC—activities that do not always run smoothly in part because
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peacekeepers have limited insight into the workings of the Congolese army
(Verweijen, 2017). Improving combat performance and behavior toward civilians
also tends to occupy center stage in defense reform efforts (Howe, 2001). Yet these
efforts do not always pay much attention to cohesion. In the FARDC, they have
mostly been directed toward the training of a few rapid reaction battalions, with each
donor training them according to their own military doctrines, which has under-
mined interoperability and institutional cohesion (ICG, 2006; Stearns, Verweijen &
Eriksson Baaz, 2013).
To be more effective, defense reform initiatives must pay attention to strengthen-
ing cohesion through measures like reinforcing meritocracy (by codifying and enfor-
cing clear criteria for appointments and promotions) and training units in the same
doctrine and in the same composition as they will be deployed in combat (cf. King,
2006). Furthermore, defense reform should work toward regularizing and guaran-
teeing soldiers’ service conditions, to reduce leeway for favoritism and insecurity
among military personnel. This insecurity is a main incentive for soldiers to seek
protection from patrons in the first place, leading them to reinforce the very patron-
age networks that are at the root of their predicament (cf. Chabal & Daloz, 1999).
Ensuring soldiers’ basic rights is therefore a precondition for breaking the vicious
cycle of insecurity and patronage, although it is by no means a guarantee.
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Notes
1. For criticism on the “standard model,” see King (2007) and Siebold (2011).
2. Although the military justice apparatus is independent on paper, it is in reality strongly
influenced by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo command
(Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen, 2013b).
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